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Curing the Ake of an Incompetent
Expert: A Separate Reviewable Issue?
The Supreme Court's mid-1980s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma
established the defendant's constitutional right to "competent psy-
chiatric assistance." However, whether this right to expert assis-
tance includes the requirement that the expert perform
competently has remained unanswered since Ake. This Comment
attempts to address this issue in the affirmative and additionally
develops a standard upon which the issue can be reviewed by the
courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The well practiced use of the expert witness extends back some
300 years.1 As society becomes more complex our need for expert
opinions in civil and criminal matters has increased.2 Expert testi-
mony has become a necessity in areas that extend beyond the gen-
eral knowledge of the average juror.' As a result, the judiciary has
witnessed an expansion of the necessary fields of expert witnesses.4
One area of particular growth has been in the mental health field.'
1. Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal De-
fendant, Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism:
Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 91 (1985).
2. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); 2 IRVING GOLDSTEIN & FRED LANE,
GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 14.01 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN TRIAL
TECHNIQUE] ("Modern civilization, with its complexities of business, science, and the
professions, has made expert and opinion evidence a necessity. This is true where the
subject matters involved are beyond the general knowledge of the average juror."); Ralph
Slovenko, The Role of the Expert (With Focus on Psychiatry) in the Adversarial Sys-
tem, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 333 (1988) (95% of tort cases involve experts).
3. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81; see supra note 2.
4. In the seventeenth century there were five recognized fields of expertise: lock-
smiths, cutlers, peruke (wig) makers, washerwomen, and rope makers. Courts now recog-
nize a variety of experts. "In court, 'expert' does not necessarily mean being tops in one's
field. It includes anyone whose knowledge of a subject extends beyond that of the average
juror.... [A]ny one with 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' who can
assist the trier of fact may qualify as an expert." This may result in a narcotics user
testifying as an expert to the identification of a drug. Slovenko, supra note 2, at 337.
5. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); ROBERT L. SADOFF. FORENSIC PSYCHIA-
TRY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS (2d ed. 1988); THOMAS
GRISSO. EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENT AND INSTRUMENTS (1986);
JOHN MACDONALD. PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL: A GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC EXAMI-
NATION FOR CRIMINAL COURTS (1976); A. Louis MCGARRY, Operational Aspects,
In recent years the psychiatrist's role has increased significantly.6
In addition to performing an evaluation to determine the defendant's
competency to stand trial,7 these experts provide evidence used in the
guilt and sentencing phase of a criminal trial. 8 Because of the states'
prolific use of these experts, a defendant would be at a disadvantage
if he were unable to utilize similar assistance. 9 Many criminal de-
fendants who are mentally impaired are also indigent, thus making it
unlikely that they would be able to afford expert assistance. 10 The
result of their poverty would be their inability to receive a fair trial.
This all changed when we reached the mid 1980s.
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court decided the pinnacle
case of Ake v. Oklahoma." Although many states had already pro-
vided indigent defendants access to psychiatric assistance in their de-
fense,' 2 it was not until the Court decided Ake that a defendant's
access to "competent psychiatric assistance" was established as his
or her constitutional right.' 3
The Ake decision followed judicial decisions establishing the re-
quirements for equal protection and due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment. These decisions required that the defendant be
provided the "adequate tools of defense" in the spirit of fundamental
fairness of trial.'" However, Ake has left a myriad of" unanswered
questions in its wake.
Training, and Qualifications in Forensic Psychiatry, in MODERN LEGAL MEDICINE, PSY-
CHIATRY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 643 (William J. Curran et al. eds., 1980); Martin R.
Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV, 99,
113-14 (1976) (psychiatric testimony a virtual necessity in cases involving insanity
pleas); Joel F. Henning, The Psychiatrist in the Legal Process, in by Reason of Insanity,
in ESSAYS ON PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 217 (Lawrence Z. Freedman ed., 1983) (psy-
chiatric witness role has grown as a result of changing legal insanity definitions and
increased judicial and legislative acceptance of the practice); HARLOW M. HUCKABEE.
LAWYERS. PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW: COOPERATION OR CHAOS? 179 (1980)
(shifting legal responsibility to the psychiatric witness); Perlin, supra note 1; GOLDSTEIN
TRIAL TECHNIQUE, supra note 2; Slovenko, supra note 2.
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
7. See GRISSO, supra note 5.
8. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-84 (1985).
9. Id. at 81. "The quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet
valueless to the defendant if the defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist ... and
no such services are available." Id. at 81 n.7 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 5-1.4, Commentary 5-20 (2d ed. 1980)). "[U]pon the trial of certain issues, such
as insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense...
• [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to
parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." Id. at 82 n.8 (quoting
Reilly v. Barry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
10. See Dorothy 0. Lewis, Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family
Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 584 (May 1988).
11. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
12. Id. at 78, 78 n.4.
13. Id. at 82.
14. Id. at 77. See also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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At the forefront of these questions is whether Ake's due process
requirement is satisfied by the mere appointment of a psychiatrist or
whether this psychiatrist must also perform competently. 15 This
Comment will attempt to address this issue. The case of Ake v.
Oklahoma is reviewed in Section II.16 Section III addresses the post
Ake era; it examines the mandate and questions posed by Ake, while
also illustrating the inadequacy by which the courts have applied this
mandate. Section IV discusses the requirements of establishing the
right to competent performance of the expert as a constitutional
right based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The concerns and obstacles that go along with establishing
such a right are examined in Section V. In an attempt to present a
solution, Section VI discusses developing a workable standard and
also applies this standard to the expert witness field of psychiatry.
II. REVIEW OF AKE
In late 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with the
murder of a married couple and the shooting of their children. 7 Due
to his bizarre pretrial behavior, the trial judge ordered that Ake be
evaluated by a psychiatrist."8 This resulted in a diagnosis that Ake
was a paranoid schizophrenic and the eventual determination that he
was incompetent to stand trial. 9 However, six weeks after Ake's
commitment to a state hospital he was deemed competent to stand
trial.20
15. See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 2; Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir.
1990); Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047 (lth Cir. 1990); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d
1497 (9th Cir. 1991).
16. This section will remain brief due to the extensive coverage in a number of
outstanding journal publications. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 1; Paul S. Appelbaum, In
the Wake of Ake: The Ethics of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, 15 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 15 (1987); Michael J. Todd, Criminal Procedure Due Process
and Indigent Defendants: Extending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Ex-
pert Assistance, 29 How. L.J. 609 (1986); Brita Haugland, Criminal Procedure: The
Constitutional Extent of the Adequate Tools of a Defense, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 273
(1986); Kimberly M. Anderson, Criminal Procedure, Indigents; Psychiatric Assistance,
74 ILL. B.J. 401 (1986); Beth Levine, Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process and an In-
digent's Right to Court-Appointed Psychiatric Assistance in State Criminal Proceed-
ings, 76 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065 (1985).
17. Ake, 470 U.S. at 70.
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id.
20. Id. (Ake stood trial while on heavy medication).
Subsequently, Ake's attorney informed the court of his client's in-
tention to raise an insanity defense.2" In order to prepare and present
an adequate defense, the attorney stated that a psychiatrist would
have to examine Ake with respect to the issue of criminal responsi-
bility.22 Ake, who was indigent, could not afford to pay for a psychi-
atrist.23 His counsel asked the court to either provide funds to allow
the defense to arrange for one or arrange to have a psychiatrist per-
form an examination at the court's expense.2 4 The lower court re-
jected the counsel's argument that the Constitution guarantees an
indigent defendant psychiatric assistance when the assistance is re-
quired for a defense and denied counsel's motion for a state funded
psychiatric evaluation.2 The lower court based its decision on the
Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi.6
As a result of this denial, Ake's mental state at the time of the
crime was never assessed, and there was no expert testimony availa-
ble from either side at trial as to an insanity defense.27 After estab-
lishing Ake's guilt, the prosecution, in the sentencing phase of the
trial, relied heavily on the testimony of the state's psychiatrist to es-
tablish the likelihood of his future dangerousness. 28 The jury sen-
tenced Ake to death plus 500 years imprisonment.2 9
On appeal, Ake raised the argument that as an indigent defendant
he should have been afforded court appointed psychiatric assis-
tance.30 The state courts rejected this argument.31





26. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). The Ake Court rejected the lower court's contention that
Smith supported a broad proposition in which the defendant has no constitutional right
to a psychiatric examination to evaluate his sanity at the time of the offense. The Court
found the record in Smith revealed the defendant was examined by neutral psychiatrists,
but found no additional assistance was necessary. The Court's disagreement with the
lower court in Ake was even more fundamental.
The Ake Court disregarded the precedent set by Smith because it was a case decided
at a time when indigent defendants had few constitutional rights in the state courts. The
right to presence of counsel did not even exist. The recognition of elemental constitu-
tional rights, which had enhanced the indigent's ability to attain a fair trial, and the
recognition of the enhanced role psychiatrists were playing in criminal trials, led to the
Court's rejection of Smith, thus relegating it to a decision addressed to "altogether dif-
ferent variables." Ake, 470 U.S. at 85.
27. Ake, 470 U.S. at 73.




31. "We have held numerous times that, the unique nature of capital cases not-
withstanding, the State does not have the responsibility of providing such services to
indigents charged with capital crimes." Id. at 73-74 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 663 P.2d
1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)).
802
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 and based their decision
upon a Fourteenth Amendment due process fairness test," balancing
private and governmental interests against the risks of error.3 4 The
Supreme Court held:
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a
minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation,
and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indi-
gent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his per-
sonal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.35
32. Ake v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
33. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. This
elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief
that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defend-
ant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceed-
ing in which his liberty is at stake....
' We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does
not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent
defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials inte-
gral to the building of an effective defense .... [T]he Court has not held that a
State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his
wealthier counterpart might buy .... [F]undamental fairness entitles indigent
defendants to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within
the adversary system."
Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77. See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (on appeal the
state must provide the indigent defendant a trial transcript if necessary to a decision on
the merits of the appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the indigent
defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985) (assistance must be effective); Strickland v. Washington, 469 U.S. 387 (1984)
(assistance must be effective). See also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)
(identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal").
34. The Court noted:
In this case we must decide whether, and under what conditions, the participa-
tion of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a defense to require
the State to provide an indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric
assistance in preparing the defense. Three factors are relevant to this determi-
nation. The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the
State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if the safe-
guard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the additional or
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
35. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. The Court came to a similar conclusion regarding access
to a psychiatrist at the sentencing phase of the trial:
The majority opinion3" left the option to the states to determine
how to implement this right.3 7 This option has resulted in an aggre-
gate of cases lacking an interpretation of Ake that truly follows its
mandate of fundamental fairness.38
III. POST AKE
A. Ake's Mandate and Unanswered Questions
The Court's decision in Ake should be viewed as a monumental
step forward for the rights of indigent defendants. After having ig-
nored the issue of expert assistance for the defense for thirty plus
years," Justice Marshall, in a broad stroke of his pen, significantly
expanded the constitutional rights of an indigent defendant. 40 In do-
ing so, Justice Marshall also gave recognition to the potency of and
necessity for expert psychiatric assistance in cases where the defend-
ant's sanity is at issue.41 Yet the issues remaining in Ake's wake
could have the effect of leaving its bite toothless.
Although powerful and informative, Justice Marshall's opinion left
some questions unanswered: namely, whether Ake's mandate extends
beyond the psychiatric expert,42 what standard must a defendant
In such a circumstance, where the consequence of error is so great, the rele-
vance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the
State so slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination on rele-
vant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in prepara-
tion at the sentencing phase.
Id. at 84.
36. There was a single dissenting opinion in which both the role of the psychiatric
expert and constitutional requirement of access to a psychiatrist was viewed from a dif-
ferent perspective:
[T]he constitutional rule announced by the Court is far too broad. I would
limit the rule to capital cases, and make clear that the entitlement is to an
independent psychiatric evaluation, not to a defense consultant ...
I would not grant the broad right to "access to a competent psychiatrist
who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, prepara-
tion, and presentation of the defense." A psychiatrist is not an attorney whosejob it is to advocate .... [A]II the defendant should be entitled to is one compe-
tent opinion-whatever the witness' conclusion-from a psychiatrist who acts
independently of the prosecutor's office. Although the independent psychiatrist
should be available to answer defense counsel's questions prior to trial, and to
testify if called, I see no reason why the defendant should be entitled to an
opposing view, or to a "defense" advocate.
Id. at 87, 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 83.
38. See infra notes 50-100 and accompanying text.
39. The Ake Court took the development of increased rights for indigent defend-
ants since Smith, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), to signal an increased commitment to assuring
meaningful access to the judicial process. Ake, 470 U.S. at 85; see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
40. Ake, 470 U.S. at 85.
41. Id. at 81-82.
42. In Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1987), the court indicated
[VOL 29: 799. 1992] Incompetent Expert
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
meet "when demonstrating to the trial judge" the need for psychiat-
ric assistance in assuring an adequate defense,43 whether the role of
the expert witness is neutral or advocate,44 and whether Ake extends
to other proceedings that do not involve capital offenses. Although
these issues remain unresolved, they appear to be on the verge of
resolution as the courts continue to apply Ake.
However, Justice Marshall has left the lid to Pandora's box ajar
where a defendant is able to successfully convince the trial judge of
his need for psychiatric assistance. Once the defendant is granted
access to assistance, do his constitutional rights extend to assure that
the assistance be provided adequately and competently? Viewing
solely Justice Marshall's holding compels an affirmative answer. Jus-
tice Marshall states:
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a
minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination . . ..
This language suggests that the Court recognized the indigent de-
fendant's rights "at a minimum"46 guaranteed access to a psychia-
trist who was considered competent by the standards of his
profession 47 and who would perform an examination that met similar
professional standards.48 Nonetheless, subsequent cases suggest the
courts have disregarded the unmistakable language of Justice Mar-
shall's opinion and have opted to limit the extension of the indigent
defendant's newly acquired rights. 9
there is no "principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and non-psychiatric ex-
perts. The question in each case must be not what field of science or expert knowledge is
involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help
a defense expert could have been." Id. at 1243, 1245 (state neglected to provide expert
assistance of hypnotist).
43. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. See also infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
44. Commentators and courts alike disagree on the psychiatrist's role. Some be-
lieve they should remain neutral and objective, while others suggest they approach the
role of "advocate." See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 2.
45. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. The concern of the courts has been what Justice Marshall
meant by "appropriate examination." If taken to mean the expert must perform compe-
tently it raises the question of whether competent performance is a reviewable right. This
question will be addressed in subsequent discussions. See infra notes 101-49 and accom-
panying text.
46. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
47. Brown v. Dodd, 484 U.S. 874, 876-78, denying cert. to Sup. Ct. Ga. (Marshall,
J., dissenting), rehg denied, 484 U.S. 982 (1987).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Dodd, 484 U.S. 874 (1987); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d
640 (11 th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1991); Clisby v Jones,
907 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1990); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990);
B. Application of Ake
Eager to try out their new "tool of defense,"50 defendants knocked
on the doors of justice ready to make their Ake claim. However, the
courts were far from hospitable. One commentator's study discov-
ered that in cases following Ake only four out of twenty-eight cases
surveyed succeeded in presenting an Ake claim for a review.5 1 The
courts dismissed the majority of these cases for failing to meet Ake's
"threshold"52 or for a policy against "doctor shopping.
1. Meeting the Threshold
Justice Marshall unequivocally laid out the threshold requirement
in Ake: before the indigent can gain access to expert psychiatric as-
sistance he must "demonstrate to the trial judge that his sanity at
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial. 54 The
Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi" further defined the stan-
dard by which the appointment of the expert is implemented. Cald-
well requires the indigent to go beyond undeveloped assertions and
show a reasonableness of need. 56 Applying this definition, the courts
have required the indigent to show a reasonableness of need based on
facts and not mere allegations. 7
2. Doctor Shopping
The courts have stymied other Ake claims based on a policy
against doctor shopping.58 These cases typically involve indigents
that have been afforded access to a psychiatrist, but not one of their
choice.5 9 For example, in Martin v. Wainwright,"° the defendant
Martin was examined by seven mental health experts prior to trial.61
Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1990); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d
1153 (9th Cir. 1990); Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1989); Martin v. Wain-
wright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir 1985); Shaw v. Delo, 762 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1991);
Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985); Sireci v. Wainwright, 502 So. 2d
1221 (Fla. 1987); Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985).
50. The "basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal" were identified by the
Court in Ake. 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,-227
(1971)).
51. Stephan Rachlin, From Impartial Expert to Adversary in the Wake of Ake,
16 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 25, 27 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 28.
54. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
55. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
56. Id. at 323 n.1; see also Rachlin, supra note 51, at 26, 28.
57. Rachlin, supra note 51, at 28.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 770 F.2d 918 (1lth Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 933.
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On appeal Martin requested that an eighth be appointed to evaluate
his claim that he suffered from organic brain damage.62 The neurolo-
gist, one of the original seven mental health experts who saw Martin,
found the defendant suffered from no such ailment. 3
The defendant's claim was not based on the incompetence64 of the
seven experts, rather that based on Ake he should be entitled to the
appointment of an eighth expert.65 The Court agreed that Ake pro-
tected an indigent's due process right of psychiatric assistance, but
refused to assert that Ake mandated a constitutional entitlement to a
favorable psychiatric opinion.66 The court dismissed Martin's claim
as "doctor shopping" and affirmed the lower court's ruling.67
C. Extending the Ake Claim Substantively
1. Reaffirming Ake
The courts' limited application of Ake reached the extreme in
Brown v. Dodd.18 In Brown, the Georgia Supreme Court appointed a
psychologist to evaluate the defendant on the day of his competency
trial.6 9 The psychologist's examination consisted of one meager
twenty minute interview.7 0 He did not talk to any of the doctors who
previously examined the defendant, did not perform any psychologi-
cal testing, and examined only a short discharge summary report. 1
In addition, the psychologist received his Ph.D. only tens days ear-
lier, was not a licensed psychologist, and had received no formal
training in conducting competency evaluations. 2
The Supreme Court still denied certiorari,7 3 effectively affirming
62. Id.
63. Id. at 934.
64. The defendant's claim was that the six other experts had erroneously relied on
the neurologist's findings and had not independently examined the defendant for organic
brain damage. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 935.
67. Id.
68. 484 U.S. 874, denying cert. to Sup. Ct. Ga. (Marshall, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 484 U.S. 982 (1987). In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated, "I would grant the
petition for writ of certiorari in order to consider whether a defendant evaluated for
competency by a state-appointed examiner has a due process right to an examiner whose
qualifications and procedures meet minimal professional standards." 484 U.S. at 874
(Marshall, J., dissenting).




73. Id. at 874.
the Georgia Court's ruling that the state met its obligation under
Ake by the mere appointment of a competent psychologist regardless
of all the other inadequacies. 4
Justice Marshall, however, though recognizing the lack of prece-
dent in regard to reviewing competence, 75 reaffirmed the implications
of his opinion in Ake:
The guarantee recognized in Ake, it is important to stress, is not just that
the State ensure access to a psychiatrist, but that it ensure that the psychia-
trist be a competent professional who will perform an appropriate examina-
tion .....
.. [T]he Constitution requires that the examiner possess minimum pro-
fessional qualifications and that his examination procedures conform to
minimum professional standards.76
The courts have seemingly ignored these proposals by Justice Mar-
shall except in cases where the psychiatric examinations are so
grossly insufficient that they warrant a rehearing. 77
2. Still Resisting as the Rumblings Grow
a. Subsequent Decisions Defining the Resistance
The courts have continued to limit their application of Ake to
avoid deciding a question of competency. In Waye v. Murray,78 the
defendant Waye, a death row inmate, brought a pro se petition for a
writ of habeas corpus based on claims of inadequate performance of
his attorneys on one hand and of his psychiatrist on the other.79 The
court held that a claim based on inadequate performance on the part
of a defense psychiatrist afforded no basis for habeas relief.80 Judi-
cial concern regarding allowing review of this issue can be seen in
the court's reasoning:
It will nearly always be possible in cases involving the basic human emo-
tions to find one expert witness who disagrees with another and to procure
an affidavit to that effect from the second prospective witness. To inaugu-
rate a constitutional or procedural rule of an ineffective expert witness in
lieu of the constitutional standard of an ineffective attorney, we think, is
going further than the federal procedural demands of a fair trial and the
constitution require. There must be some finality to litigation .... 81
74. Id. at 875-76.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 876-77.
77. State v. Sireci, 502 So.2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1987) (new sentencing is required
when psychiatric examinations are grossly insufficient); Mason v. State, 489 So. 2d 734,
736 (Fla. 1986) (rehearing required because examiners ignored clear indications of
mental retardation in the defendant).
78. 884 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1989).
79. Id. at 766.
80. Id. at 765.
81. Id. at 767. Making the ineffectiveness of a psychiatrist a subsidiary claim has
been discussed by others. Rachlin is concerned that making the review of a psychiatrist's
performance a separate claim would impose the standards and ethics of the practice of
law on the practice of psychiatry. Rachlin, supra note 51, at 31-32. Considering the
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Continuing with similar concerns, the court in Silagy v. Peters8 2
was reluctant to open up the case to a "battle of experts in a 'compe-
tence' review.''83 The Silagy court claimed that a competence review
would lead to a never-ending process. 4 The court further suggested
that a competence review would conceivably open up to review every
aspect of a criminal case involving an expert, culminating in a never-
ending battle of experts where the sole purpose would be to discredit
each other.86
Although unnecessary to decide the case, the Silagy court rea-
soned that a battle of the experts was not the intent of Ake.86 In
Silagy, the court considered a state's Ake obligation met when an
indigent defendant was afforded access to psychiatric assistance
without regard to the ultimate diagnosis."7 This holding again limits
Ake to mean that mere access to expert assistance is sufficient.
b. Bending but Not Breaking Under the Pressure of Ake-Based
Competence Claims
In Harris v. Vasquez,"" the court of appeals wrestled with Ake's
objective to achieve a fundamentally fair and accurate trial.a9 De-
fendant Harris claimed his psychiatrist performed inadequately and
petitioned for a rehearing to allow him to be examined by a subse-
quent psychiatrist.90 The court proceeded to hide behind the limiting
practices to be extremely different, he feels such an idea of reviewability would be un-
workable. Id. at 32. In addition, further consideration should be given to the standard of
ineffective counsel review. Counsel are required to perform reasonably under the circum-
stances. This suggests that ineffective psychiatric assistance could go unquestioned as
long as counsel perform reasonably. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (the standard of review of effectiveness of counsel).
82. 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 1013.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Silagy claimed his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was denied
because the psychiatrists who examined him were incompetent in their examinations and
ultimate diagnosis regarding his sanity at the time of offense and that the diagnosis and
trial testimony were not professionally sound. Id. at 1001. Silagy based this claim on
alleged fictitious experiences in Vietnam which he related to the psychiatrists. The psy-
chiatrists had expressed skepticism about Silagy's allegations. Id. The court dismissed
the claim for lack of support in the record. The court reasoned that even if the allega-
tions were worthy of review it would be reluctant to open up the case to a "battle of
experts." Id. at 1013.
87. Id.
88. 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1275, reh'g denied, 961
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992).
89. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
90. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1524.
language of Ake-"This is not to say ... that the indigent defendant
has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal lik-
ing . . ."91-and ruled that Ake did not guarantee Harris access to
favorable conclusions. 2 The court ultimately dismissed the claim,
noting that allowing the defendant to search for an additional psy-
chiatrist whose opinion might undermine the findings of the previous
psychiatrist would do little to further the objective of fairness and
accuracy in criminal proceedings.93 Yet, further reasoning by the
court suggests an underlying competence standard was considered by
the court before it dismissed the claim. The court in Harris dis-
missed the defendant's claim after noting the record showed no evi-
dence that the psychiatrist was "unlicensed, inexperienced, or
u nqualified." 94
Similarly, in Clisby v. Jones9 5 the court of appeals ruled the psy-
chiatrist was competent "by reason of his education, training, and
licensure to perform a psychiatric examination on the defend-
ant. ... 96 Both courts have defined their view on what "competent
91. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83; Harris, 949 F.2d at 1516 (citing Ake, 470 US. at 83
("indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive funds to hire the
psychiatrist of his choice")).
92. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1516 (quoting Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185 (5th
Cir. 1989)). However, it is worth noting that the value of Harris as authority on this
point has been undermined by Justice Alarcon's dissenting opinion in which he notes that
the majority opinion on this point is purely dicta. Id. at 1545-46.
93. Id. at 1520.
94. Id. at 1521. The court in Harris has suggested that because the psychiatrist
was licensed, possessed experience in sanity evaluation, and was otherwise qualified to
perform the evaluation, the state satisfied its Ake requirement, ensuring the defendant's
due process rights. Id. But, as we have seen, e.g., in medical malpractice and effective
counsel challenge cases, the prerequisites which ensure that a physician or counsel are
competent to perform their services do not guarantee the competent performance. See,
e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); David L. Bazelon, The Realities of
Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811 (1976); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon
Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 625 (1985-1986); Nelson P. Miller, The
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions, 30 FOR THE DEF. 7 (Dec. 1988).
95. 907 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir.), vacated, 920 F.2d 720 (11th Cir. 1990).
96. 907 F.2d at 1050. The Clisby court has decided that there may be something
to 'the proposition that Ake requires more than mere access to a competent psychiatric
expert:
In its pre-en banc hearing memorandum to counsel, the Eleventh Circuit in-
structed counsel to submit arguments on the following questions:
4) A. What does Ake require of a court appointed psychiatric evaluation? Spe-
cifically, does it require only that the psychiatric evaluator be considered pro-
fessionally competent in his or her general practice, or does it also require that
the examination actually performed be competent and that assistance be pro-
vided to defendant's counsel? How would the analysis of the facts in this case
differ under each interpretation?
B. What did Clisby's counsel request that the state provide (a psychiatric
examination, a psychiatric examination and assistance to counsel in under-
standing the psychiatrist's diagnosis, etc.)?
C. If the state has appointed a psychiatrist to assist the defendant in the
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psychiatrist" meant in the Ake holding, but neither has addressed
what Ake meant by "appropriate examination and assist . .
defense."97
As a result, the standard used by these courts has stopped short of
providing an indigent defendant true fairness in a criminal proceed-
ing. The standard used defines the specifications of a tool to assist in
defense,9 8 but provides no avenues for review to determine whether
the tool has functioned properly. The premise of providing tools of
defense is that the tools are capable of providing meaningful assis-
tance.9 9 Therefore, by not recognizing a right to performance review
after providing the defendant with expert assistance, the decisions by
these courts only mock Ake's decree of fundamental fairness. 00
IV. RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT PERFORMANCE AS
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The right to competent expert assistance was found to exist within
the notions of due process as set forth in Ake' 0' and subsequently
followed by state and federal courts." 2 It follows then, that if there
exists a right to have not only access to a competent expert, but to
have that expert perform "competently," this right must exist within
the notions of due process. If this right exists, in order to give it
meaning, it should be reviewable on direct appeal and by collateral
attack in state and federal courts. 10 3
manner in which the defendant has requested, is the state chargeable for the
errors the psychiatrist may make in the discharge of his professional
responsibilities?
Petitioner's Second Supplemental Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc at 22 n.27, Harris (No. 90-55402) (citing Clisby, 920 F.2d 720 (11 th Cir.
1990)). Argument before full en banc court was conducted June 10, 1991. Id.
The circuit court refused to address these issues because they had not been previously
addressed by the district court. Thus, the circuit court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to resolve these issues. Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 934-935
(I Ith Cir. 1992) (as of this writing the district court has yet to rule on these issues).
97. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
98. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
99. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1530 (Noonan, J., dissenting). See also Brown v. Dodd,
484 U.S. at 486 (defendant may be placed in worse position when subject to substandard
evaluation than if denied evaluation in the first place).
100. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1535 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
101. 470 U.S. at 76.
102. See supra notes 33-96 and accompanying text.
103. "[U]nless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a proven constitutional
right did not taint the conviction, the Constitution requires a new trial." Bazelon, supra
note 94, at 825 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
A. Within the Notions of Due Process
The elementary principle of fundamental fairness in the adversary
system is significantly grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." 4 Due process guaran-
tees that the indigent has the opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the adversary system, providing him with a fair opportunity to
present a defense.105 In Ake, this fair opportunity to present a de-
fense, when the defendant's sanity is at issue, was determined to
mean, at a minimum, access to competent psychiatric assistance. 106
But, is the defendant really provided a fair opportunity to present a
defense if the expert that the defendant has access to does not per-
form competently? The answer is a resounding "no" when the poten-
tial for inaccurate findings that create a risk of erroneous deprivation
of life, liberty, and property is considered.
The potential for error intensifies when the expert's performance is
immune from review. Without any possibility of review, the door to
the extreme is left wide open. The result may be an expert's total
failure to perform or an expert who severely cuts corners. This sce-
nario could be disastrous to the unsuspecting defendant. Until the
courts adopt the right to competent expert assistance as a reviewable
right and establish some minimum by which the experts must per-
form, the system will proceed under the pretense of fundamental
fairness while the potential for inaccurate findings and risk of erro-
neous deprivation of life, liberty, and property remains.
1. Due Process and Accuracy of Trial
A trial is fundamentally unfair when the determination of a de-
fendant's guilt or responsibility is based on inaccurate factual find-
ings. 10 7 Disagreement is likely in cases involving expert witnesses,
104. The Due Process Clause reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
105. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76; Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c)
(1964) (providing that a defendant shall receive assistance of all experts necessary for an
adequate defense).
106. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
107. The Ake Court acknowledged this concern when evaluating the private indi-
vidual's interest in a fair trial: "The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal pro-
ceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling.
Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by this Court over the years to diminish the risk
of erroneous conviction stands as a testament to that concern." Id. at 78.
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thus leaving the jurors as the primary fact finders.108 Yet, when ju-
rors make a determination as to foreign or complex issues, the testi-
mony of an expert can be crucial, if not a virtual necessity, to
making the most accurate determination of the truth. 0 9 For this rea-
son, states, as well as private individuals who can afford them, rely
on the testimony of expert examiners, consultants, and witnesses." 0
Therefore, the primary fact finder is less likely to make the most
accurate determination of the truth when forced to analyze informa-
tion that is the product of an expert's inadequate performance, and
in some cases his lack of performance."'
2. Meaningful Access to the Judicial System
Coinciding with the goal of accuracy in the judicial process is the
goal of providing meaningful access to justice. Meaningful access is
a consistent theme throughout the case law leading up to and follow-
ing the Ake decision." 2 It has been evident to these courts that ac-
cess to the courtroom does not guarantee proper functioning of the
judicial process."' The defendant is guaranteed his due process
108. Because of the lack of consistency between experts, the jury remains the pri-
mary factfinders on the issue at trial and must resolve the difference of opinion. Smith v.
McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990).
109. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80; Brown v. Dodd, 484 U.S. 874, 876, denying cert. to Sup.
Ct. Ga. (Marshall, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 982 (1987). "Expert testimony
is the most compelling evidence offered to the jury charged with the task of evaluating a
defendant's competency. . . . '[W]hen jurors make determinations about issues that inev-
itably are foreign and complex testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial.'" Dodd, 484
U.S. at 876-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 81).
The psychiatric expert performs three functions which may be crucial in cases where
the mental health of the defendant is of substantial issue:
1) Aid defendant in determining whether the defense based on the mental condition is
warranted.
2) Coherently present to the jury his observations of the defendant, his understanding
of the defendant's mental history, and how his observations and the mental history are
relevant to the defendant's mental condition.
3) Assist defendant in preparing cross exam.
Smith, 914 F.2d at 1157.
110. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
Il1. Id. at 81. Recognizing the importance of the expert's performance and con-
veyance of the results to the jury, the Ake Court reasoned:
By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behav-
ior, and other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise, and then
laying out their investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists
for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination of the
truth on the issue before them.
id.
112. Id. at 77; see supra notes 39-96 and accompanying text.
113. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
rights when he is provided the raw materials integral to building a
defense.114 In contrast, a defendant's rights are deprived when the
procedures to ensure he is provided these raw materials break down
and result in a less than fair opportunity to present a defense.
However, meaningful access can be accomplished when the indi-
gent defendant is provided with the "basic tools of an adequate de-
fense."'1 5  Unfortunately, these procedures which attempt to
guarantee due process effectively breakdown when the tools of de-
fense provided do not function properly.116
The court in Ake recognized the expert psychiatric witness as a
basic tool of defense in cases where the defendant's sanity is a signif-
icant issue in the trial. 11 The psychiatrist plays a crucial role when
the defendant's mental condition is relevant to determining his cul-
pability. The psychiatrist's evaluation provides information integral
to an insanity defense." 8 By performing incompetently, or not at all,
the psychiatrist's evaluation of the defendant's sanity is probably in-
accurate." 9 Consequently, the defendant is denied access to the raw
materials integral to making an insanity defense. The likely result is
a fundamentally unfair trial.
It is evident that to ensure the mandate provided in Ake has
meaning, access to a competent expert must include the expert's
competent performance. It follows then that competent performance
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 484 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
116. Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1529-31 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J., dis-
senting) (the defendant is at a great disadvantage if the state's experts are the only ones
performing effectively).
117. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 83.
[W]ithout assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination
on issues relevant to defense, to help determine whether an insanity defense is
viable, to present testimony and to assist in preparing cross-examination of the
state's psychiatric witnesses, risk of inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is ex-
tremely high. With such assistance the defendant is fairly able to present at
least enough information to permit the jury to make a sensible determination.
Id at 82.
118. Id.
[The] psychiatric witnesses play a larger and, at least arguably, more realis-
tic role in informing the court about the mental and emotional state of the
defendant ...
Expert testimony now can inform the courts on a deeper and more sub-
tle range of psychiatric issues concerning the appropriate disposition of crimi-
nal cases.
Henning, supra note 5, at 219-20.
119. Brown v. Dodd, 484 U.S. 874, 877 (1987) (defendant may be placed in a
worse position than if denied evaluation in the first place). Just as in Ake, where the
defendant was considered at a disadvantage when only the state had access to experts,
the defendant would also be at a disadvantage if only the state's experts acted effectively.
Harris, 949 F.2d at 1529-31 (Noonan, J., dissenting); see supra note 116 and accompa-
nying text.
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is within the notions of due process, thus making it a reviewable is-
sue in which there is some minimum standard of performance the
expert is required to provide.120
B. Other Related Constitutional Claims
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is the most important source upon which to base a claim, 2' other
potential Constitutional sources exist. These sources, though, are in-
tegrally related to a due process claim, consequently making them
less important and potentially less effective. 22
1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted to ensure that defendants have equal access to justice.12 3
There can be no equal justice when the defendant's ability to mount
a defense is limited by his or her ability to pay.' 24 Nevertheless, the
courts are unwilling to expand the defendant's substantive rights
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Ake Court confirmed this
limitation, recognizing that a state is not required to purchase for an
indigent defendant all that his wealthier counterpart can.' 25
An attempt to expand constitutional rights based on the Equal
Protection Clause could only succeed if'shown to be essential to en-
sure fundamental fairness in the adversary system. 2 Fundamental
fairness is essentially grounded in the Due Process Clause. 121 There-
fore, the Equal Protection Clause would not be used to expand con-
stitutional rights, but used to ensure the indigent defendant is not
deprived fairness because of his inability to pay.
120. See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (right to review). See
supra notes 33-96 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 123-49 and accompanying text.
123. The Equal Protection Clause reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONsTr. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (Black, J.) ("There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has."); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
125. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 76. See also supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
2. Sixth Amendment
The Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 However, the
Constitution defines the basic elements of a fair trial in large part
through several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the
Right to Counsel, Confrontation, and Compulsory Process
Clauses.'29
a. Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment is not a mere supplement to other constitu-
tional rights. The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel Clause
serves to ensure procedural and constitutional protection guaranteed
to a criminal defendant.130 Counsel plays a crucial role in the adver-
sary system. As a result, the courts have recognized that this guaran-
teed right comprehends a level of competence. 13' Counsel provides
the skill and knowledge necessary to ensure that the defendant can
adequately meet the case of the prosecution and bring about a just
result. 32
In Blake v. Kemp, a33 the court seems to imply that the defense
counsel could not provide competent assistance adequate to meet the
prosecution's case without the competent assistance of a psychia-
trist. 3 4 By equating the right to adequate psychiatric assistance to
128. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76; see also supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
129. The Sixth Amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (prevailing standard for measuring
effectiveness of counsel); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
130. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 94.
131. The Court in Strickland recognized that the constitutional guarantee compre-
hends a degree of competence and that the state is not discharged of its duty by ap-
pointing an attorney who fails to render adequate legal assistance. 466 U.S. at 685; see
also Brown v. Dodd, 484 U.S. 874 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 484
U.S. 982 (1987). The notion of effective counsel was recognized 50 years earlier in Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the Court acknowledged that the defendant
was entitled to effective and substantial aid, not just the appointment of a warm body.
Bazelon, supra note 94, at 819 (citing Powell, 287 U.S at 53). As Bazelon notes, the
concern is not whether the defendant received assistance of effective counsel, but whether
he received the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 823. See also Klein, supra note 94,
at 823.
132. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (citing Adams v. United States ex rel Mcann,
317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)).
133. 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985).
134. See Rachlin, supra note 51, at 31.
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that of effective assistance of counsel,135 the psychiatric assistance
should be subject to the standard by which counsel's performance is
measured.
This standard consists of two components. 6 The first component
is whether the counsel's assistance was reasonably effective consider-
ing all the circumstances. 37 Read literally, a court could find the
counsel's assistance to be reasonably effective notwithstanding the
inadequate performance of an assisting expert. Yet, recent case law
suggests that counsel must adequately explore psychiatric assistance
if it can be shown that assistance was needed. 38 Therefore, a logical
step in this argument is to automatically find the counsel's assistance
inadequate if the psychiatric assistance was incompetent. If the psy-
chiatric assistance was truly incompetent, then the counsel must not
have adequately explored the avenues to expert assistance.
However, some commentators have argued that the right to psy-
chiatric assistance is not as fundamental to the adversary system as
the right to counsel and should only exist as a subsidiary claim, not
as a wholly separate claim.' 3 9 This argument recognizes that the ob-
ligation to provide counsel is rooted within the specific language of
the Sixth Amendment. 4 This root in the language of the Constitu-
tion suggests to some that the right to assistance of counsel requires
more of the state than the obligation to provide the indigent with
psychiatric assistance. 4'
Neither the right to effective assistance of counsel nor the right to
effective assistance of a psychiatrist are explicit in the text of the
original Constitution or the Bill of Rights.'42 Both have been born of
experience in determining how to preserve the rights that are
135. Id.
136. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991); Bertolotti v. Dug-
ger, 883 F.2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1989); Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1989).
139. Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1989) (inaugurating a constitu-
tional rule of ineffective expert witness in lieu of the constitutional standard of ineffective
attorney goes further than the procedural demands of a fair trial required by the Consti-
tution); Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047, 1050 (1 lth Cir.) ("Psychiatrists are widely used,
but they are not so fundamental as legal counsel to the adversarial process. And, unlike
legal counsel, not mentioned in the Constitution."), vacated, 920 F.2d 720 (1990), re-
manded, 960 F.2d 925 (1992) (see discussion supra note 96).
140. Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047, 1050 (1lth Cir.), vacated, 920 F.2d 720
(1lth Cir. 1990); see supra text accompanying note 138.
141. Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1531 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. See also supra note 129.
granted by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Both are essential
elements that along with the Due Process Clause ensure that funda-
mental fairness is preserved in the adversary system. 143 Therefore,
fairness seems better served if the right to effective assistance of a,
psychiatrist, or other experts, parallels (rather than is subsidiary to)
the notion that the right to assistance of counsel implicitly includes a
level of competent performance.
b. Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses
Under the Sixth Amendment the defendant is guaranteed the
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."'1 44 These
guarantees ensure that the trial will be a contest of witnesses. When
expert witness testimony is necessary to determine issues at trial, it
is crucial that the defendant have access to an expert witness to en-
sure the trial does not cease to be a contest of witnesses. 45
In Ake the Court recognized the significance of the role a psychia-
trist plays when the defendant's mental condition is at issue. 4" Ake
mandates that a defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist
to "assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the de-
fense.' 47 With this expert assistance, the defendant is able to prop-
erly cross-examine the prosecution's experts. Without access to this
assistance, or if it is insufficient, the defendant risks an inadequate
cross-examination. The trial then ceases to be a contest of witnesses,
and the expert testimony consists virtually of that provided by the
state's experts alone.148 A just result can hardly be achieved under
those circumstances.
In order to expand constitutional rights based on the Confronta-
tion and Compulsory Process Clauses, as with the Equal Protection
Clause, there must be a showing that the expansion is essential to
ensure fundamental fairness in the adversary system. As previously
noted, fundamental fairness is essentially grounded in the Due Pro-
cess Clause, 149 and therefore, it would be better served by a claim
based on due process rights.
143. See supra notes 101-40 and accompanying text,
144. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
145. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1531 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
146. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82; see supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
147. 470 U.S. at 83.
148. See id. at 82-83.
149. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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V. ASSOCIATED CONCERNS AND OBSTACLES
A. Right to Competent Expert Assistance Separate from Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The prospect of making the right to competent expert assistance a
separate and wholly nonsubsidiary right to that of effective assis-
tance of counsel has raised fears within the judicial community.
Some of these fears include the following: we are opening the door to
Pandora's box, we are subjecting the judicial system to a battle of
experts, there will be no finality to the cases because a defendant will
always be able to get a second expert or psychiatrist to say his first
performed incompetently, the rest of the criminal justice system will
suffer while the courts "sink in a morass of post-trial challenges,
'150
and so on.151
The post-trial challenge of expert or psychiatric assistance would
effectively increase the areas in which state court rulings can be
questioned. However, this was also true when the courts recognized
the right to effective assistance of counsel. 152 The judicial system has
been able to handle the resulting increase in appeals. Although the
judicial system may be ailing under its current load of cases and
appeals, the potential increase in appeals is not a strong enough in-
terest to temper state and individual interests in fundamental
fairness.' 53
It is also true that experts or psychiatrists are likely to disagree.
150. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1531 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1517 (majority opinion) (expressing reluctantance to open an Ake
claim up to a "battle of the experts in a 'competence review' "). See also Silagy v. Pe-
ters, 905 F.2d 986, 1012 (7th Cir. 1990) (Even if the claim was true, the court would be
reluctant to open the case up to a battle of experts in a competence review. The court
feared the prospect that every aspect of a criminal case involving an expert could con-
ceivably be subject to this type of review, resulting in a never ending process.); Waye v.
Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1989) ("It will nearly always be possible in cases
involving the basic human emotions to find one expert witness who disagrees with an-
other .... [T]here must be some finality to litigation."); Clisby, 907 F.2d at 1050
(expressing concern that a competence review would result in a never ending battle of the
experts).
152. When dealing with an ineffective counsel claim, the court feared an increase
in their caseload, no finality, and a decrease in prison discipline. Klein, supra note 94, at
635 (citing People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979)).
153. In Ake, the Court weighed the state's economic interest of not providing psy-
chiatric assistance against the state and individual's interest in accurate adjudication.
The Ake Court found that economic interests are not enough to temper the interest of
accuracy and are outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, and
property. 470 U.S. at 77; see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Similarly, when
dealing with the question of expert competency, economic interests should not outweigh
the fundamental interest of accuracy.
For example, psychiatry is considered a soft science subject to the
subtleties of many biases. The profession has seen four dramatic
changes in recent years in their diagnostic testing standards.5 4 But
what field of expertise does not experience change, growth, and disa-
greement? There is no profession that achieves complete harmony of
opinion, including law. Lawyers are known for their ability to de-
velop differing positions from those of their peers. The likelihood of
disagreement on the effectiveness of another's trial strategy has not
made "unworkable the constitutional insistence on effective
assistance." 155
The courts have learned how to measure effective performance in
criminal trials,156 just as other disciplines have learned how to mea-
sure effective performance when there is disagreement and differing
schools of thought. 157 The expert witness should be viewed no differ-
ently. There should be no barriers to developing standards to mea-
sure the effectiveness of expert assistance provided to the defendant.
154. The American Psychiatric Association's (APA) first edition of Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I) appeared in 1952. It reflected a psy-
chobiologic view that mental disorders represented reactions of the personality to psycho-
logical, social, and biological factors. In 1968, DSM-II emerged discarding the term
reaction, "but by and large, did not imply a particular theoretical framework for under-
standing the nonorganic mental disorders." In 1979, the field saw the emergence of
DSM-III which was instituted to reflect the most current state of knowledge regarding
mental disorders. Yet, as early as 1983, the APA began work on the revision of DSM-
III. The revision was called DSM-III-R. The APA's goals in DSM-III-R were:
I) clinical usefulness for making treatment and management decisions in va-
ried clinical settings;
2) reliability of the diagnostic categories;
3) acceptability to clinicians and researchers of varying theoretical
orientations;
4) usefulness for educating health professionals;
5) maintenance of compatibility with International Classification of Dis-
eases (ICD-9-CM) codes;
6) avoidance of new terminology and concepts that break with tradition ex-
cept when clearly needed;
7) attempting to reach consensus on the meaning of necessary diagnostic
terms that have been used inconsistently, and avoidance of terms that have
outlived their usefulness;
8) consistency with data from research studies bearing on the validity of
diagnostic categories;
9) suitability for describing subjects in research studies;
10) responsiveness, during the development of DSM-III-R, to critiques by cli-
nicians and researchers.
The first printing of DSM-III-R occurred in May, 1987. The future holds more changes
for DSM, as DSM-IV is already in the workings. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) (3rd ed.
rev. 1987).
155. Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1532 (9th Cir. 1990) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
156. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 94; Bazelon, supra note 94; Miller, supra note 94;
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., 668 (1984).
157. E.g., the American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association,
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B. Insufficient Record an Obstacle of Review
A lack of evidence in the record is an obstacle that needs to be
overcome in any review situation. However, lack of evidence of a
psychiatrist's or any other expert's performance could unfairly sway
the outcome of an appeal. 158 Record of the procedures followed in
the psychiatrist's or expert's analysis should be used to determine the
competence (or lack thereof) of the performance.
In order to overcome this obstacle the courts should develop a
standard by which the petitioner on appeal shoulders the burden of
proof. The courts are familiar with this scenario. In medical mal-
practice cases, as well as effective counsel challenges, the courts have
required the plaintiff or petitioner to bear the burden of proof.159
The burden of proof must go beyond merely proving that the stan-
dard by which performance is measured was not met. Such a stan-
dard would allow the mere lack of evidence in the record to be used
to infer that the proper procedures were not followed by the expert,
resulting in inadequate performance. 160 The burden of proof should
require the petitioner to make a prima facie case, based on the show-
ing of "affirmative" evidence, that a standard was not met.' 6' This
requirement would alleviate concerns that the judicial system would
be overburdened by fictitious claims and would help establish finality
in the process.' 62
However, placing the burden of proof on the petitioner raises the
question of privilege: should the petitioner be required to waive the
attorney-client privilege as to the expert? The petitioner is unable to
American Psychiatric Association, American Society of Mechanical Engineering, Ameri-
can Bar Association, and others, have developed methods for testing and licensing indi-
viduals within their professions.
158. In Harris, the procedures followed by the psychiatrists at the trial level were
not recorded. At appeal, these psychiatrists were no longer available to testify as to their
evaluation of the defendant. One had died; the other was out of the country. 949 F.2d at
1508. If the jury is to determine the competence of the performance of these psychiatrists
from what exists in the record, they can only infer that their evaluations were
inadequate.
159. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); J.H. King, In
Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice"
Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1976).
160. See supra note 158.
161. By requiring affirmative evidence, the defense attorneys will not be able to
have psychiatrists or other experts perform an evaluation but not make any records in
anticipation of an appeal of ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1990) (lack of discovered evidence not sufficient for second habeas),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 21 (1990).
162. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
hide behind the privilege when bringing an effective assistance of
counsel claim. 16 3 Similarly, if the petitioner wishes to challenge the
competence of the expert's performance, the petitioner should affirm-
atively yield up all information regardless of the privilege involved.
Such a requirement should also help alleviate any potential of over-
burdening the judicial system with fictitious claims.
VI. ESTABLISHING A WORKABLE STANDARD
In order to guarantee a defendant's right to competent perform-
ance of an expert, a standard for review must be developed. Without
a measurable standard the right would amount to nothing more than
an "empty container," leaving the defendant powerless to enforce his
right.""
Just as other professions have learned to measure performance
where disagreement or differing schools of thought exist, the courts
have learned to measure performance in criminal and civil cases. For
instance, cases involving medical malpractice and effective counsel
challenges are regularly adjudicated.' Accordingly, there is no rea-
son why a workable standard could not be developed to measure the
performance of an expert at trial.
A. Modeling a Standard
1. Utilizing the Medical Malpractice Standard as a Guide
"[T]he medical malpractice standard has long been based on the
customary standard of practice of members in good standing in the
profession."'1 6 In Pike v. Honsinger,6 7 this common law standard
was set forth:
A physician and surgeon, by taking charge of a case, impliedly represents
that he possesses, and the law places upon him the duty of possessing, that
reasonable degree of learning and skill that is ordinarily possessed by physi-
cians and surgeons in the locality where he practices. 16 8
This strict same locality rule has yielded to a more flexible rule in
recent years. The most prevalent version of the standard is based on
the level of learning and skill that is possessed by others in the same
or similar locality.'69 The defendant's conduct is then judged in
163. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
164. See Klein, supra note 94.
165. See supra notes 156, 159 and accompanying text.
166. Miller, supra note 94, at 7.
167. 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898).
168. Id. at 209, 49 N.E. at 762 (quoted in Miller, supra note 94, at 7).
169. See, e.g., Goedecke v. Price, 19 Ariz. App. 320, 506 P.2d 1105 (1973); Siirila
v. Barrios, 58 Mich. App. 721, 228 N.W.2d 801 (1975); Bailey v. Williams, 189 Neb.
484, 203 N.W.2d 454 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965); James
Duff, Jr., Annotation, Malpractice Testimony: Competency of Physician or Surgeon
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terms of a professionally developed standard, sometimes expressed as
the customary practice of other similarly situated members of the
profession. 170
This standard is flexible enough to apply to the expert witness
with differing fields of expertise. A petitioner can make out a prima
facie case of inadequate performance by, first, producing evidence
that establishes the applicable standard of performance (e.g., the
procedures of analysis that should be followed), and second, produc-
ing affirmative evidence that demonstrates this standard was
violated.17 1
a. Custom Versus Accepted Practice Standard
The accepted practice standard emphasizes professionally ap-
proved practices rather than focusing merely on the habitual ones
defined by professional custom. 17 2 This standard makes good sense in
professions where there are national standards for accreditation and
licensing, or where there are nationally organized professional socie-
ties and publications. In these cases, the similar locality requirement
is effectively defined by a national community.173
But in cases where there is no uniformity in determining profes-
sionally accepted practices, it is necessary to remain flexible.'1 4
These cases require a standard based on the customary practices of
others in the same or similar localities.' 5
from One Locality to Testify in Malpractice Case, as to Standard of Care Required of
Defendant Practicing in Another Locality, 37 A.L.R.3d 420, 424 (1971 & Supp. 1974)
(physicians).
170. See King, supra note 159, at 1235.
171. Id. at 1234.
172. Id. at 1236.
173. See generally supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
174. E.g., the plaintiff is required by the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Review
Board and Claims Act of 1975 in a medical malpractice action to "prove 'the recognized
standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and specialty thereof, if any
.... " King, supra note 159, at 1236 n.101 (quoting Tennessee Medical Malpractice
Review Board and Claims Act of 1975, ch. 299, §§ 14(a)(1), 17(a), Tenn. Pub. Acts
669, 671 (1975)). Where there is no consensus on accepted practice in the profession, the
question remains as to what standard should be used to measure performance. This sug-
gests a need to be flexible and use the standard most applicable in a case by case
analysis.
175. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
b. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Not Available to Establish
Prima Facie Case
In the medical malpractice and effective counsel cases it is pre-
sumed that the services have been performed in an ordinarily skillful
manner.1 6 But, there is no guarantee of success. As stated by Justice
Traynor:
A physician does not guarantee a cure. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
cannot properly be invoked to make him an insurer of the recovery of per-
sons he treats. The Latin words cannot obliterate the fact that much of the
functioning of the human body remains a mystery to medical science and
that risks inherent in a given treatment may occur unexplainably though
the treatment is administered skillfully.""
Similarly, the expert does not guarantee a defense for the defend-
ant. For example, one function of the psychiatrist is to perform an
evaluation to determine if the defense of insanity is viable.178 Be-
cause psychiatry, just as other professions, may be filled with subtle-
ties left to the expert's own judgement, the fact that two experts do
not concur in the evaluation of a defendant should not impute inade-
quate performance as to either expert. 179
2. Paralleling Effective Counsel Challenges
The prevailing standard for review of effective assistance of coun-
sel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington.8 0 The test consists of
two parts which the plaintiff must satisfy. First, it must be shown
that the counsel's performance was deficient, that he made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as counsel guaranteed to the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 181 Second, it must be shown
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to the point
he was deprived of a fair trial. 18 2 Each part of this test is required to
show a breakdown of the adversarial system. 183
The first part of the Strickland test tends to mirror that which
176. See Miller, supra note 94, at 9; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984).
177. Miller, supra note 94, at 9 (quoting Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 421-
22, 426 P.2d 525, 541, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 141 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., concurring and
dissenting)).
178. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
179. There is no right to a psychiatrist that will provide a favorable evaluation.
See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1515 (9th Cir. 1990) (see supra note 92 and
accompanying text); Clisby v. Jones, 907 F.2d 1047 (11 th Cir. 1990); Martin v. Wain-
wright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985).
180. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
18 1. Id. at 687.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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was modeled above,"' requiring that some minimal level of perform-
ance not have been met in order to make out a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance. However, the second part of the test has been
criticized.1 15
Requiring the plaintiff to show he was prejudiced by the deficient
performance is believed to minimize the importance of the right
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by speculating on the outcome
of a trial." 6 In addition, this extra component to the test appears to
inhibit review by increasing the plaintiff's burden disproportion-
ately.187 Thus, the focus has been placed on the ends and not the
means of the trial. As a result, there remains the question of whether
fundamental fairness is actually served.
However, a balance must be struck for the courts to ever allow
this sort of review of the expert's performance. True fundamental
fairness would place the focus on the means of the trial. Thus, the
expert's performance would be the sole concern, and not the likeli-
hood of the outcome of the trial. Yet, this focus would confirm the
fears that such a right to review would place the judicial system in a
morass of fictitious claims.
Therefore, the balance that must be reached will preserve funda-
mental fairness for the petitioner while providing a self-limiting stan-
dard of review. The second prong of the effective counsel challenge,
requiring a show of prejudice, has effectively limited the ability of
the petitioner to bring fictitious claims.' Moreover, it has limited
the number of claims challenging the effectiveness of counsel and,
therefore, should be followed as a model for challenging the ade-
quacy of an expert's performance.
B. Applying the Standard to the Psychiatric Expert
In defining a standard for the performance of a psychiatric expert,
the national community must be considered to determine the cus-
tomary professional procedures or practices.' 8 9 The psychiatric com-
munity is continually changing and developing new schools of
184. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 94; Bazelon, supra note 94, at 825 (quoting Glas-
set v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)) ("[R]ight to assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount
of prejudice arising from its denial.").
186. Klein, supra note 94, at 641.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The profession contains national organizations and publications. See. e.g.,
thought.Y90 Although there are different schools of thought as to
what checklists or particular procedures should be followed in the
assessment of the defendant,' there seems to be a consensus as to
what is required to perform an adequate overall evaluation of the
defendant's sanity. 92
An evaluation is considered adequate if it consists of: (1) direct
assessment of the defendant through multiple personal interviews of
significant length; (2) indirect assessment of the defendant through
the review of all pertinent information; 193 and (3), which the com-
mentators have put the most emphasis on,' medical examination
for careful assessment of medical and organic factors contributing to
or causing psychiatric or psychological dysfunction. 9
Therefore, adequate performance of a psychiatric expert can be
defined by accepted professional practices. As a result, the courts are
provided a standard by which to measure a psychiatrist's perform-
ance and the standard modeled above is satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ake was a monumental step forward for indigent defendant rights.
By guaranteeing the indigent defendant the right, at a minimum, to
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW. BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION. ETC.
190. See, e.g., supra note 154 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., HAROLD KAPLAN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TRY 543 (4th ed. 1985); GRISSO, supra note 5, at 36 (forensic assessment instruments
may improve quality of assessment by providing relatively standardized and qualitative
procedures for acquiring legally relevant assessment data); THOMAS G. GUTHIEL ET AL.,
CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 342 (1991) (checklist to ensure
systematized evaluation); MCGARRY, supra note 5, at 655 (checklist).
192. See supra note 191.
193. This could consist of third party interviews of family and friends, medical
history, prior exams, police reports, etc.
194. SILVANO ARIETI. AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1161 (2d ed. 1974).
Before, describing the psychiatric examination itself, we wish to emphasize
the importance of placing it within a comprehensive examination of the whole
patient. This should include a careful history of the patient's physical health
together with a physical examination and all indicated laboratory tests. The
interrelationships of psychiatric disorders and physical ones are often subtle
and easily overlooked. Each type of disorder may mimic or conceal one of the
other types .... A large number of brain tumors and other diseases of the
brain may present as "obvious" psychiatric syndromes and their proper treat-
ment may be overlooked in the absence of careful assessment of the patient's
physical condition. The psychiatrist cannot count on the patient leading him to
the diagnosis of physical illness. Indeed, patients with psychiatric disorders
often deny the presence of major physical illness that other persons would-have
complained about and sought treatments for much earlier.
Id. See also supra note 190.
195. See supra note 191. This should include a battery of psychological tests such
as MPI, Bender, and Waite IQ, in addition to EEG, Allury, and RIRI tests. Although
these tests are primitive, they may give an indication that there is something abnormal
about the defendant.
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access competent expert assistance, the Court moved closer to assur-
ing fundamental fairness at trial. Yet, without ensuring that the ex-
pert perform competently by providing an opportunity for review,
the Ake mandate has remained elusive.
It is time to move forward and accept the defendant's right to
competent performance as one which exists within the notions of due
process. There is no logical basis for the barriers against such a re-
view, especially when these barriers prevent the guarantee of a fair
and accurate trial for all defendants.
KENNETH S. ROBERTS

